with generalised conceptions of validity. Indeed, the defining positions in early Critical Theory all suggest -albeit in different terms -that the emergence of post-Enlightenment rationality manifests itself in a formal juridification of human reason, which impoverishes both reason and its contents by defining reason as an exclusively regulatory mechanism. The development of modern rationality is thus always parallel to the development of human subjectivity in the form of a regulatory subject or a legal subject. 1 The legal subject provides a fulcrum for social order by making possible the imputation of responsibility, the assertion of regular expectations, and the legislation of conditions of societal and cognitive predictability across time and place. But the legal subject also marks a most restricted mode of social and cognitive agency, for it reduces thinking to that of a formal and possessive apparatus, emptied of determinate content and defensively confronting objects solely as facts for organisation and calibration (DE, 20) .
In political and sociological terms, the main implication of the relation posited in early Critical Theory between modern reason and modern law is that it sets out an epistemological critique of liberalism. Above all, it argues that the central foundation of liberal politics -the belief that the rational human subject, abstracted from determinate experience and centred in formal rights and entitlements, contains within itself the immutable foundations of its own autonomy and forms the irreducibly legitimising core of the political order under which it lives -has contributed to the production of a social reality based on a suppression of real freedom and on a pathological reduction of human social being for the satisfaction of ongoing economic interests. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, for example, are quite clear about the deceptive nature of the rational-legal subject of liberalism, and they view it as a malign fiction around whose organisational cognitive processes modern capitalism stabilises itself (DE, 2). In distant relation, Walter Benjamin argues that the types of liberal, constitutional or social-democratic order resulting from the rationalised model of subjective autonomy offer only the most self-deluding experiences of justice and legitimacy.
2 Friedrich Pollock identifies a direct nexus between classical-liberal private law and the state-capitalist regulation of the economy in the 1930s.
3 Similarly, Franz Neumann sees early liberal legal structures, centred in abstract rights and formal-legal autonomy, as mere ciphers which facilitate the contractual organisation of labour in the private economy. 4 The formalisation of legal principles in liberalism, Neumann argues, obstructs the elaboration of emancipatory forms of law, and the promise of universal rationality and autonomy held out by liberal law directly impedes
